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INTERPRETING NEW LABOUR’S POLITICAL DISCOURSE ON 
THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS 
 
Aaron Edwards 
Abstract 
New Labour‟s superintendence of the Northern Ireland peace process has 
re-opened debate about the party‟s stance on the “Irish question”. While 
some commentators hold the view that it remains ideologically wedded to the 
nationalist goal of Irish unity, it could be argued that Labour‟s Northern 
Ireland policy has been characterised by an ambivalent non-interventionist 
approach. The “peace strategy” pursued by Tony Blair‟s three 
administrations between 1997 and 2007 is examined in light of the political 
discourse articulated by key actors within New Labour itself. Moreover, the 
interpretive approach in British political science is utilised to illuminate key 
variables, such as ideology and values, driving the party‟s view on 
sovereignty in the United Kingdom more broadly. In applying this analytical 
framework the article explains how New Labour‟s policy towards Northern 
Ireland underwent significant adaptation under Blair‟s leadership and why it 
finally achieved its overarching objective of consigning the violent conflict to 
atrophy. 
 
Introduction 
 
One problem with Tony [Blair]‟s fundamental view of Northern Ireland 
is that the process is the policy, that as long as the process is being 
sustained and you are giving plenty of evidence that you believe in the 
process, even if you can do nothing else, that is sufficient policy. (Peter 
Mandelson, former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, cited in the 
Guardian, 14 March 2007) 
I would tell Tony that, no matter what, we had to try to keep things 
moving forward, like a bicycle. If we let the bicycle fall over, we would 
create a vacuum and that vacuum would be filled by violence … By the 
end, we had realised peace was not an event but a process. (Jonathan 
Powell, former Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Tony Blair, 2008, p. 5) 
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This paper considers the underlying ideological dynamics of New 
Labour‟s “peace strategy” in Northern Ireland by concentrating on three key 
components in its political discourse: devolution, bipartisanship and 
consent.
1
 It is argued here that these concepts underwent significant shifts in 
meaning after 1994, which permitted Tony Blair to move his party from a 
position of “persuaders for Irish unity” in the early 1990s to a position of 
“neutral arbitration” when returned to power in 1997. Moreover, in order to 
understand its “peace strategy” more fully these “endogenous” changes must 
be considered in light of the “exogenous” constitutional reconfiguration of 
the United Kingdom polity. Indeed, it is argued here that New Labour‟s 
policy towards Northern Ireland should be understood, can only be 
understood, in relation to the party‟s successful synergy of both of these key 
drivers in its political discourse. 
 
The “New” in New Labour’s Northern Ireland Policy 
 
Drawing on the interpretive work of Bevir and Rhodes (2003, 2006) 
this article critically analyses New Labour‟s political discourse on the 
Northern Ireland peace process. In methodological terms, the interpretive 
approach is concerned with traditions, contexts and dilemmas in politics. 
“Tradition”, in the sense that Bevir and Rhodes deploy the concept, acts as a 
backdrop but does not fix everything; it is “an initial influence” on actors that 
colours their later actions but is always contingent (Finlayson et al., 2004, p. 
150). In many ways traditions are enabling ideological backdrops, against 
which actors are permitted to make informed choices within a specific socio-
political context. Moreover, when an actor becomes conscious of the rigid 
restrictions that may be placed upon their future actions by adhering to such 
traditions it is possible for them to lighten their ideological baggage by 
embracing a new idea. The point at which this self-realisation occurs is 
known as a dilemma. As Bevir and Rhodes (2003, p. 36) explain: “A 
dilemma arises for an individual or institution when a new idea stands in 
opposition to existing beliefs and associated traditions”. 
 
Explaining Ideological Change within the Labour Party 
 
New Labour‟s political discourse on Northern Ireland could be said to 
have encountered such a dilemma. In line with Bevir and Rhodes (2003, p. 
37) it is possible to demonstrate how, in order to “accommodate a new idea, 
people must develop their existing beliefs to make room for it, and its 
content will open some ways of doing so and close down others”. This paper 
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examines how and why an ideological dilemma arose within the Labour 
Party vis-à-vis its political discourse on Northern Ireland. In re-defining their 
policy the architects of “New” Labour were keen to distance it from that of 
“Old” Labour. As Bevir and Rhodes (2003, pp. 197-198) elaborate: 
New Labour rejects the command bureaucracy model of old Labour 
with its emphasis on hierarchy, authority and rules … New Labour 
does not seek to provide centralised “statist” solutions to every social 
and economic problem. Instead New Labour promotes the idea of 
networks of institutions and individuals acting in partnerships held 
together by relations of trust … Patterns of governance arise as the 
contingent products of diverse actions and political struggles informed 
by beliefs of the agents as they in turn arise against a backcloth of 
traditions and dilemmas. 
In the Northern Ireland context, as elsewhere, “the triumph of Blair‟s 
vision of New Labour over other strands of social democracy represents the 
outcome of a contingent political struggle” (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003, p. 140). 
The “contingent political struggle” – in the sense that it is employed in this 
article – is shown to be as hard-fought-out between New Labour‟s own left 
and right as it is with its electoral opponents in the Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat parties. 
In her political memoirs Blair‟s first Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland Mo Mowlam (2002, p. 162) reveals how the formulation of Northern 
Ireland policy - in the wake of her party‟s victory in the 1997 British general 
election - was born out of the necessity to balance internal tensions between 
several Labour interest groups: 
As members of a party with a long tradition of fighting for justice and a 
fairer society, a lot of people in the Labour Party had been close 
supporters of the civil-rights movement in Northern Ireland in the 
1960s and 1970s, which translated for many into support for Irish 
nationalism. But [after 1997] we were no longer a campaigning 
opposition. We now had a clear position, standing, in my shorthand, for 
“neutrality, with fairness, justice and equality”. That meant we could 
do things as a government to further those crucial values, while at the 
same times maintaining our neutrality in the talks. 
However, the reality was somewhat more complex than Mowlam cared 
to admit, in that Labour‟s policy towards Northern Ireland ebbed and flowed 
according to a number of factors. Other variables not already mentioned 
included the personal interests of individual leaders, their dexterity in 
managing backbench critics in Parliament and the aims of certain Labour 
interest groups. Furthermore, it was a policy tempered to a large degree by 
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other domestic and foreign concerns of the day. Thus during his post-war 
government Clement Attlee (Labour leader, 1935-55) took a pro-unionist 
stance on Northern Ireland and invested heavily in passing legislation that 
secured the province‟s political survival. Such favourable rapprochement 
emerged directly from Northern Ireland‟s role in aiding the British war-
effort. Conversely, during its long spell in Opposition under Hugh Gaitskell 
(Labour leader, 1955-63) Labour maintained a close association with the 
cross-community Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP), thus maintaining a 
partitionist outlook. Only under Harold Wilson (Labour leader, 1963-76) did 
the party pursue a more green-tinged policy, something subsequently resisted 
by his successor James Callaghan (1976-79). 
This ambiguous stance has led some critics, like Brendan O‟Leary 
(2004, p. 196), to conclude that “Statements they [Harold Wilson and James 
Callaghan] made before or after their premierships showed they had 
formulated preferences substantively different from the status quo, but in 
office did nothing that significantly advanced these goals”. The move in 
Labour Party circles towards open support for Irish unity was hastened under 
the leadership of Michael Foot (1979-83) and Neil Kinnock (1983-92). 
Significantly, by the time John Smith (1992-94) had taken over from 
Kinnock the Irish question had been subordinated to the wider electoral 
ambitions of the party, where it was to remain until Tony Blair assumed the 
leadership in the wake of Smith‟s untimely death. 
It was under Blair that New Labour‟s policy on Northern Ireland 
underwent considerable adaptation between 1994 and 2007 in which a 
devolved settlement based on the “principle of consent”, not “unity by 
consent”, became the central plank in the governing party‟s peace strategy. 
Although in many respects it represented something of a clean break from 
the rigid “green” (i.e. sympathetic to the Irish nationalist aspiration for Irish 
unity) orthodoxy of the 1980s, it was nonetheless a by-product of the trade-
off undertaken by Labour‟s leaders in a bid to make the party more electable 
while diffusing internal tensions on Ireland. Thus, the policy of “unity by 
consent” was dropped in favour of non-interventionism in Irish affairs. While 
this new departure was qualitatively different from the policy pursued under 
Wilson‟s Labour governments of 1964-70 and 1974-76, it does share 
common ground with that pursued under Gaitskell in the 1950s and early 
1960s (see Edwards, 2007, 2009). An acceptance of majority consent, 
regionalism, and a locally devolved administration had long since formed the 
backbone of the party‟s immediate post-war policy towards Northern Ireland 
(Dixon, 1993). 
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Devolution 
 
In his resignation speech on 10 May 2007, Tony Blair made just one 
minor reference to Northern Ireland in which he said, “I think Northern 
Ireland would not have been changed unless Britain had changed”. Change 
in Britain, and in government policy towards the province, under Blair 
centred round major constitutional and territorial adjustment, which saw an 
effective return to devolved government in the three peripheral regions of 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Labour‟s commitment to devolution 
remained strong during Blair‟s decade as Prime Minister and in some ways 
demonstrates how New Labour sought to redress the issue of sovereignty in 
the absence of a more radical “Old” Labourist agenda. Arguably, Blair, 
rather than seeing devolution as an effective conflict management tool, 
viewed its utility through the much broader prism of constitutional reform. 
Before coming to power he remarked: 
I find it odd to say the least that the government proposes devolution 
for Northern Ireland as part of a package designed to keep the Union 
together but says that devolution anywhere else is irresponsible and 
reckless (Blair, 1996, p. 82). 
The empowerment of the ordinary citizen became a recurring theme in 
New Labour discourse throughout its first three terms of office. It is evident 
in a speech made by the former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Peter 
Hain (2006)
2
 at the time of the St. Andrews Agreement, when he pointed out 
that: “Devolution gives local politicians the power to take local decisions 
about local issues. I hope they will grasp this opportunity and fulfill the 
obligations for which they have long been elected”. In New Labour discourse 
this decentralisation of governance sprang from both a deep-seated belief in 
empowering ordinary people and in a firm commitment to achieving a 
peaceful settlement to this most enduring of conflicts. 
A commitment to reconfigure the constitutional landscape of the UK 
was the key point of differentiation between New Labour‟s policy towards 
Northern Ireland and that of its political counterparts or predecessors.
3
 As 
indicated above constitutional reform remained a crucial element of New 
Labour‟s vision for a “New Britain”, wherein power was devolved to the 
constituent (or peripheral) parts of the UK in a way that reflected the party‟s 
own radical democratic socialist tradition. Tony Blair‟s vision for a “New 
Britain” is evident in his Maiden speech to the people of Northern Ireland, 
delivered at the Royal Ulster Agricultural Society in Belfast in 1997: 
I want to see a Union which reflects and accommodates diversity. I am 
against a rigid, centralised approach. That is the surest way to weaken 
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the Union. The proposals this government are making for Scotland and 
Wales, and for the English regions, are designed to bring Government 
closer to the people. That will renew and strengthen the Union. 
However, it must be borne in mind that devolution was conceived for 
an altogether different purpose in Northern Ireland than elsewhere in the UK. 
As Bradbury and Mitchell (2005, p. 295) point out: 
In Scotland and Wales the purpose of devolution had been to 
accommodate national feeling within a decentralised UK. In contrast, 
in Northern Ireland devolution had been a mechanism to reconcile 
implacably opposed nationalist/republican and unionist/loyalist 
perspectives on the nature of government and to assist a wider “peace 
process” for scaling down sectarian violence between and within the 
two communities. 
A devolved, power-sharing arrangement between Protestant Unionists 
and Catholic Nationalists became the preferred outcome for the settlement of 
the local conflict. On a much broader level devolution, as a form of 
federalism, is a useful conflict management device for application in 
conflicts where ethno-nationalist feeling has spilled over into violence. 
While there is disagreement in the academic literature about the effects of 
federalism on ethno-nationalism (Hechter, 2004, p. 296), with some 
commentators arguing that it exacerbates it and others that it accommodates 
it, few would argue that it plays no role at all. In Zartman‟s (2004, p. 154) 
view: 
Despite the fears of many governments, autonomy is not a down 
payment on secession: Cancellation of autonomy is. When minorities 
are granted self-government in autonomy, it gives them something to 
do that takes their minds off of secession and conflict and puts the 
emphasis on skills at governing rather than on contesting government. 
By emphasising devolution in New Labour‟s political discourse Blair 
was afforded the opportunity to push the case for greater autonomy for the 
UK regions, while at the same time taking the sting out of what M.L.R. 
Smith (1999, p. 80) has called the „single most destabilizing force in British 
politics for a generation‟. Despite the Conservative Party‟s hostility towards 
devolution New Labour was able to successfully maintain “at least the façade 
of bipartisanship” (Powell, 2008, p. 88) on Northern Ireland affairs. 
 
Bi-partisanship 
Bi-partisanship has been defined by Dixon (2001, p. 345) as, “a general 
agreement between the two main British political parties on the principles of 
the constitutional approach towards the conflict in Northern Ireland”. The 
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acceptance of the so-called “principle of consent”4 in constitutional matters 
has been central to the creation of a common approach to the conflict by 
British political parties. However, bi-partisanship has not always been the 
motivating factor behind Labour Party policy on Northern Ireland, as 
indicated above. In 1981, owing to pressure from its left-wing who were 
aggrieved by Margaret Thatcher‟s handling of the republican Hunger Strikes, 
Labour officially declared itself in favour of a united Ireland, albeit by the 
reaching of democratic consent within Northern Ireland (Dixon, 2006, p. 
119; see also Edwards, 2009, Chapter 7). Nevertheless, the explicit meaning 
behind this change in policy was later elaborated on by the former Labour 
Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Kevin McNamara, who 
remarked “Because I believe that unity by consent is the only viable strategy 
for ending partition, I am convinced that the party should be actively 
pursuing such a policy” (Tribune, 1 December 1989). 
The tacit acceptance of bi-partisanship by McNamara and other 
nationalist sympathisers in the 1980s - added to the increasing divergence 
between Labour and Conservative policies on Northern Ireland - led some 
observers to believe that a change-over in future government would herald a 
return of a British administration sympathetic to the concerns of Irish 
nationalists. Indeed, the NILP (Labour‟s „sister‟ party in the province) had 
formally broke off its fraternal relationship with Labour on this very issue, 
when, following a meeting with Michael Foot, the local party accused him of 
pursuing “the idiotic and undemocratic policy of „rolling republicanism‟ 
which was adopted at the last party conference” (Belfast Newsletter, 4 
February 1982). 
However, the integrity of the Labour Party‟s nationalist bias and its 
willingness to act on such instincts has been seriously questioned by some 
scholars. As John Whyte (1993, p. 107) pointed out, although “There has 
always been a minority in the Labour Party with united-Ireland sympathies” 
(including former Prime Minister, Harold Wilson), “the limits of the feasible 
have reasserted themselves, and in practice Labour governments, faced with 
the adamant opposition of unionists to any kind of united Ireland, have 
proved as committed to the union as Conservative ones”. Despite the ups and 
downs in the peace process, bi-partisanship remained the most consistent 
guiding principle of successive British governments throughout the Direct 
Rule period, far outlasting the fringe tendencies of some interest groups 
within the Conservative and Labour parties. In the House of Commons, as 
Cunningham has observed, “the bilateral management of Northern Ireland … 
[soon became] the orthodoxy” (2001, p. 159). 
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Indeed, another dimension of New Labour‟s management of the peace 
process has been its ability to sustain its bilateral relationship with the Irish 
government, a process cultivated by John Major in the early 1990s. In its 
1997 election manifesto, New Labour indicated its willingness to work with 
the Irish government to secure peace in the province, and from his first 
meeting with Bertie Ahern it later transpired that Tony Blair and the new 
leader of Fianna Fáil had “hit it off immediately” (Powell, 2008, p. 88). The 
personal chemistry between the two men, added to Blair‟s appreciation of the 
nuances of Irish history, meant that when Ahern later became Taoiseach a 
more concerted effort to solving the conflict could be adopted. As a result of 
this transformation in Anglo-Irish relations Blair became the first British 
Prime Minister in modern history to address the Oireachtas (Irish 
Parliament). His speech had a dual aim: to appeal to the two communities to 
reconcile their differences, and to reassure unionists that – unlike his 
predecessors - he was not harbouring an anti-partitionist agenda. Thus, he 
argued: 
a framework in which consent is guaranteed is also one in which 
basic rights of equality and justice are guaranteed … those who wish 
a united Ireland are free to make that claim, provided it is 
democratically expressed, just as those who believe in the Union can 
make their claim … My point is very simple. Those urges to belong, 
divergent as they are, can live together more easily if we, Britain and 
the Irish Republic, can live closer together too (Blair, 1998). 
It is in this context that Mowlam made the candid admission that 
Blair had dropped the term “persuader” because it was politically loaded and 
insensitive to the unionist community. Now, the emphasis was on bringing 
both communities together to negotiate a fair and equitable settlement. The 
logic behind this recalibration in Labour discourse was simple, yet proved 
flawed in the longer-term: shore up the moderates at the expense of the 
extremists. 
Another point to highlight under the theme of bi-partisanship is that the 
policies of the Conservative and New Labour governments towards Northern 
Ireland were not that radically different. While tactics certainly varied - 
depending on the tempo of progress made on the political front - the strategy 
underpinning the British government‟s approach was not chameleon-like, 
changing according to the party in power. In fact, rather than stressing 
“consistent inconsistencies” acute to British policy, as Brendan O‟Leary 
(1997) has suggested, it may be more profitable to agree with Michael 
Cunningham‟s (2001, p. 153) characterisation of it in terms of its “strategic 
continuity”. By far the starkest illustration of this can be seen in relation to 
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the continuities of the Major and Blair governments (Patterson, 2001), when 
“London returned to its traditional role as an honest broker and facilitator for 
agreement” (Neumann, 2003, p. 186). 
With the benefit of hindsight one could argue that Blair sacrificed old 
Tory shibboleths about talking to terrorists for the benefit of safeguarding 
momentum in the peace process, certainly this is true with regard to his 
negotiations with republicans (see Edwards, 2008a; Powell, 2008, p. 313). 
The revelations by Peter Mandelson (who replaced Mowlam as Secretary of 
State between 1999 and 2001) confirm as much. Some years after leaving 
Northern Ireland, Mandelson claimed that: 
In order to keep the process in motion [Blair] would be sort of dangling 
carrots and possibilities in front of the republicans which I thought 
could never be delivered, that it was unreasonable and irresponsible to 
intimate that you could when you knew that you couldn‟t (Guardian, 
13 March 2007). 
Mandelson‟s criticisms serve to reinforce the view that New Labour had 
discontinued its dogmatic nationalist approach to Northern Irish affairs. By 
shoring up the unionists – while appearing to grant concessions to 
republicans - Blair was actually creating the conditions for the two groups to 
come together. That he chose to do so by applying a mixture of “carrot and 
stick” tactics points to Blair‟s sense of conviction politics noticeable 
elsewhere, particularly in relation to foreign policy (see Chandler, 2003). 
Nevertheless, Blair‟s relationship with unionist MPs, for example, 
was not bound by the same rules that prevailed during his predecessor‟s time 
in office. Ulster Unionist MPs had proved crucial in maintaining the 
Conservative balance of power in the House of Commons for the duration of 
John Major‟s government. With his 165 seat majority Blair was under no 
such obligation, though he chose to keep unionists onboard, albeit while 
endeavouring to reach out to republicans. Yet Blair chose to mollify unionist 
concerns about his new government‟s agenda and sought to stress his party‟s 
support for the “principle of consent” vis-à-vis the constitutional status of 
Northern Ireland. 
 
Consent 
Although New Labour did undergo a certain amount of “greening” 
during much of its long spell in opposition in the 1980s, close reading of the 
party‟s discourse on Northern Ireland would challenge the assertion that its 
policy was ostensibly anti-partitionist in its strategic outlook. Even during 
the most radical phase of its Northern Ireland policy, the party‟s leadership 
(including spokesman Kevin McNamara) did not endorse the left-republican 
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view held by some Labour politicians (such as Ken Livingstone) that, once in 
power, the party should coerce unionists into a united Ireland. In a report 
McNamara co-authored with Mo Mowlam and Jim Marshall (McNamara et 
al., 1988, p. 10), they declared, “openly to all the people of Northern Ireland 
that we seek to persuade them of the merits of Irish unity and to win their 
support for it”. As already indicated the principle of “unity by consent” 
constituted the cornerstone of “Old” Labour‟s policy until 1994, when 
“New” Labour gravitated towards support for a political arrangement based 
on the “principle of consent” (see Neumann, 2003, p. 148; Powell, 2008, pp. 
11-12). 
The shift is evident in Blair‟s maiden speech on Northern Ireland, in 
which he was at pains to set out his newly elected government‟s agenda on 
consent: 
My message is simple. I am committed to Northern Ireland. I am 
committed to the principle of consent. And I am committed to peace. 
A settlement is to be negotiated between the parties based on consent. 
My agenda is not a United Ireland – and I wonder just how many see 
it as a realistic possibility in the foreseeable future. Northern Ireland 
will remain part of the United Kingdom as long as the majority here 
wish. 
Two important themes are discernable in the above extract. Firstly, 
that Blair was keen to reassure the unionist community that his recent 
electoral triumph posed no direct threat to the constitutional status of 
Northern Ireland. Secondly, that New Labour‟s intentions for the future 
peace and prosperity of Northern Ireland were genuine, and that any 
impending British government initiative would be grounded firmly in the 
principle of consent. Blair‟s speech was important because it signalled a 
radical departure from the “green” dogmatism, which was widely perceived 
to buttress Labour policy on Ireland (Dixon, 2006, p. 133; Powell, 2008, pp. 
12-13). A discursive shift in New Labour‟s policy implied that constitutional 
change (whatever form it may take) must be negotiated by all of the parties 
to the conflict and then be ratified by both unionist and nationalist 
communities. 
This was an important first step in New Labour‟s bid to instigate a 
strategic sea-change in its policy. As Blair‟s Chief of Staff, Jonathan Powell, 
recalled: 
This policy [of Irish unification by consent] had been an uncomfortable 
compromise cobbled together in the early 1980s to split the difference 
between two irreconcilable wings of the party: a small but highly 
motivated band of pro-unionists and the “Troops Out” movement. The 
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result was a green-tinged ambition to achieve a united Ireland by 
persuading the unionists to participate in it, even though it was 
perfectly obvious the unionists were not going to be persuaded. Tony 
replaced this mishmash with a policy of neutrality, where the job of the 
British government would be to help reconcile the two communities in 
Northern Ireland and find a solution that both could accept (2008, pp. 
79-80). 
Thus, New Labour had moved away from the old ideal of “unity by 
consent” towards a new umpire-like stance on the peace process. 
In many ways Blair had already prepared the ground for this shift in 
Labour discourse prior to coming to office. Following the announcement of 
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) ceasefire in August 1994, Blair‟s advisers 
gave explicit instructions to Kevin McNamara that the party leader, not the 
party spokesman on Northern Ireland, would handle the media on the issue. 
Shortly afterwards McNamara was sacked, thus becoming an early casualty 
in Blair‟s wholesale clearout of its more “tricolour-waving” old guard. He 
was replaced by the more congenial and down-to-earth Mo Mowlam – a 
candid politician with a sharp mind and a deep interest in Northern Ireland 
affairs. Michael Cunningham (2001, p. 92) argues that “one has to be careful 
not to exaggerate the significance of these changes”; however, it soon 
became clear that New Labour had initiated a shift in its approach to the 
conflict and Mowlam “fitted in happily with the change in policy” (Powell, 
2008, p. 80). This is despite the fact that Mowlam, along with Peter Hain and 
Clare Short (later to become Cabinet ministers in Blair‟s government), had 
been involved in pushing the “unity by consent” policy. By 1997, Hain and 
Short had embraced the new policy departure, although their personal views 
on the matter remain unclear (see Dixon, 2006). 
In an interview just prior to the 1997 election, Mowlam spelt out 
“New” Labour‟s radical departure from “Old” Labour‟s pro-Irish nationalist 
agenda: 
There is now a general acceptance that the future of Northern Ireland 
must be determined by the consent of the people as set out in the 
Downing Street Declaration [1993]. Labour recognises that the option 
of a united Ireland does not command the consent of the unionist 
tradition nor does the existing status of Northern Ireland command the 
consent of the nationalist tradition. We are therefore committed to 
reconciliation between the two traditions and to a new political 
settlement which can command the support of both (Irish News, 4 April 
1997). 
Interpreting New Labour‟s  
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1 
- 71 - 
 
Mowlam had demonstrated her ability to think more holistically about 
what a potential settlement in Northern Ireland might look like. It also 
permitted Labour to distance itself from the Conservative policy of 
sympathetic support for the Unionist community, by maintaining a focus on 
both communities. Many of Blair‟s speeches during his decade in office re-
iterated the need for parties in the conflict to end terrorism as a means by 
which to achieve political ends. As he pointed out in 2001: 
Look, underneath all the language and the detail of the agreement is 
this very simple concept that there has to be the notion of consent, that 
democracy rules, not violence, and alongside that there has to be justice 
and equality for all communities … And in the end, what has really 
been accepted by everybody is that there is no solution to this issue of a 
military kind. Violence offers no way forward. We are never going to 
change Northern Ireland by violence. 
The changing meaning of consent became increasingly tethered to the 
need to put clear blue water between the hard-headed realist view that war is 
simply a continuation of politics by other means and the idealist notion that 
democracy and co-operation offered a panacea for redressing the exclusivist 
nature of ethno-nationalism. 
 
Conclusion 
The overarching argument of this article has been that New Labour‟s 
“peace strategy” in Northern Ireland must be seen in light of “endogenous” 
ideological change within the Labour Party, as well as the “exogenous” re-
configuration of territorial sovereignty arrangements in the UK more 
broadly. By concentrating on articulating the benefits attached to these 
rapidly changing constitutional arrangements, New Labour could situate their 
internal policy adaptation amidst the new realities of governance in Britain. 
As Powell (2008, p. 20) later reasoned, “No longer was devolution a mark of 
the exceptional status of Northern Ireland, but rather a process going on 
across the whole of the United Kingdom” and as such made it easier for New 
Labour to sell a deal of power-sharing for local politicians. Initially, 
government policy towards the parties in conflict was aimed at bolstering the 
moderates at the expense of the extremists, a favoured tactic of government 
sponsors of peace processes more generally (see Zartman, 2005). This 
strategy, put in place soon after New Labour gained power, was summarised 
by Mo Mowlam: 
whatever had happened in the past, now the British government had to 
be, in my mind a referee, especially when it was important to the 
process to keep shoring up the moderate leadership on both sides 
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against the hardliners on the fringes. We had to make progress and try 
to reward either side for moving as we went along, so that they could 
say to their followers they weren‟t moving first or they weren‟t moving 
for nothing. It was essential to keep David Trimble and Gerry Adams 
in place, because without them it would have been much harder to 
sustain the peace process. (Mowlam, 2002, p. 164)  
One of Blair‟s most significant early achievements was brought about 
by carefully tempering his discourse within a tightly controlled framework of 
reference for unionists. Thus, Blair encouraged David Trimble and the Ulster 
Unionist Party to move towards a deal (see Trimble‟s comments in an 
interview with the Guardian, 14 March 2007) for the benefit of the wider 
unionist community. 
However, as Trimble (2008) has recently admitted this was not always 
successful and had the adverse effect of completely transforming the political 
environment in Northern Ireland. Thus Powell (2008, p. 312) later confessed: 
At first we tried to build from the centre, working with the UUP and 
the SDLP. But in the end perhaps it was inevitable that peace could 
only be made by the DUP and Sinn Féin on the principle of “Nixon 
goes to China” – it is only the extremes who can build a durable peace 
because there is no one left to outflank them. 
In all of this Blair played a formidable role in the process by heavily 
investing his own time in developing “peace strategy”. As John Rentoul has 
written: 
Blair brought his own gifts and his own luck to the issue which has 
broken Prime Ministers and governments before. His relationship with 
Bill Clinton was one, but his negotiating skill, his ability to finesse 
issues of deep principle which Major, with his party‟s unionist 
assumptions, found difficult, and his unnatural personal persuasiveness 
were his unique contribution (2001, p. 418). 
Encouraged by Powell (2008, p. 316) Blair sought to facilitate talks 
between the parties in conflict by coercing them with enforced deadlines and 
by encouraging the United States to apply its soft power as a useful third 
party mediator. Blair‟s amiable relationship with Bill Clinton developed 
significantly during the former‟s first term in office. Perhaps most 
importantly of all was Blair‟s personal drive to solving the Northern Ireland 
conflict, which was perhaps the one key component in helping to shape New 
Labour‟s political discourse on the peace process. As one critic wryly 
suggested: 
The [1998 Belfast] agreement was testimony to his talent for creative 
ambiguity, his gift for persuasion, his negotiating skills and his 
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willingness to expend huge amounts of effort and ingenuity in a cause 
that he believed in (Rawnsley, 2007). 
It is often said of Blair that he failed in the foreign policy arena 
(particularly in Iraq), but that he succeeded on the domestic front in Northern 
Ireland. This is perhaps a little too simplistic and does not take into 
consideration the remarkable dialectical relationship between the two 
conflicts in New Labour policy-making. Indeed, the tremendous synergy 
accomplished between the endogenous and exogenous variables driving 
Labour‟s peace strategy in Northern Ireland was underpinned by the need to 
reaffirm human rights, equality and democracy in societies where violence 
had become endemic. Perhaps Blair‟s “failure” in Iraq was not so much in 
the message he communicated but in the way it was interpreted. 
 
Endnotes 
* I would like to thank the editors for their suggestions on how to improve 
the article for publication. Any remaining errors are the author‟s sole 
responsibility. The views expressed in this article are the author‟s and not 
those of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the Ministry of Defence or 
any other UK government agency. 
 
i
 “New” Labour is the pre-fix given to explain the modernisation of the core 
ideological parameters of the British Labour Party since Tony Blair became 
leader in 1994. The term itself was used by those inside the party who drew 
conceptual distinctions between “Old” Labour and “New” Labour in a bid to 
make the Labour Party more electorally relevant. It implied a break with the 
past dogmatism of the trade union dominated left-wing by the party‟s 
modernising right-wing. 
2 
Rt. Hon. Peter Hain MP, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 
between 2005 and 2007, made a similar claim in a guest speech to British 
Labour Party members at Queen‟s University Belfast on the eve of the talks 
leading up to the St. Andrews Agreement in October 2006. While his 
comments were largely welcomed, his musings over the benefits of an all-
island economy caused something of a stir (Author‟s Fieldnotes, 10 October 
2006). 
3
 It should be noted that this strategy of constitutional rearrangement has had 
some adverse effects, not least in fuelling the widely-held perception that 
devolution has weakened the union. Ten years after devolution in the UK, 63 
per cent of respondents in an ICM poll for the Sunday Telegraph said that the 
union (between the constituent parts of the UK) had weakened under New 
Labour, while only 18 per cent thought that it had been strengthened (ICM, 
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2008, p. 7). The issue of devolution divides the UK‟s two main parties, with 
the Labour Party in favour of further decentralisation and the Conservative 
Party against. During his premiership John Major often made the point that 
devolution threatened the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the UK. As 
he wrote in his memoirs, “We advanced the argument, which I strongly 
endorse, that the Union still had enormous moral and political relevance in 
shaping our society. Moreover, it was, and is, vital in enabling the United 
Kingdom to exert its full influence in the world affairs. If the UK were to 
split into its component parts it would not wield the same influence. Its voice 
would be fragmented and marginalised” (Major, 1999, p. 421). However, the 
Tories did not oppose devolution for Northern Ireland, which was often seen 
as the only viable option for a settlement of the conflict. 
4
 The “principle of consent” refers to the internationally recognised 
legislation passed in Britain and Ireland after 1998 which states that the 
constitutional future of Northern Ireland will remain unchanged until such 
times as the majority of the people consent to a united Ireland. 
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